

Attachment #1 to OSBW-931

25 November 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO: CWE/2
FROM: CSR/3
SUBJECT: NIGHTWATCH

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 25X2
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Purpose of this Memorandum:

- a. The purpose of this memorandum is to impart to W/2 whatever knowledgeability has been accumulated on emigre group operations, in general, and CAMBISTA 1 problems, specifically, in the course of SR/3's dealings with them.
- b. SR/3's views regarding the participation of CAMBISTA 1 personnel in REDSKIN activities are offered, and data currently available to SR/3 on individuals being considered or used by W/2 for NIGHTWATCH is supplied.

2. SR/3 Policy Re Operational Utilization of Emigre Groups:

- a. SR/3 experience in conducting group operations has shown that emigre groups should not be used to attack operational objectives where such objectives can be attained through other means. This policy is based on the following considerations:
 - (1) The political aims and partisan character of emigre groups cause them to claim equal rights in the conduct of operations and an equal share in the exploitation of assets derived from such operations. This amounts to running joint-operations.
 - (2) Internal group politics and organizational allegiance of individual members of the group result in dual jurisdiction over their operational activities and this, consequently, may preclude effective KUBARK control over their performance.
 - (3) The combination of (a) security laxity found among emigre groups; and (b) known RIS interest in the activities of such groups creates dangerous security hazards which should be weighed carefully prior to exposing KUBARK objectives to emigre groups. It is particularly undesirable to expose new KUBARK methods and objectives to emigre groups being used operationally for other purposes since the RIS is more apt to track new operational activities when carried out by elements known or suspected to engage in anti-communist activities, or simply watched by the RIS.

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3. Performance of CAMBISTA 1 Personnel:

a. CAMBISTA 2 influence: The fact that CAMBISTA influences almost all aspects of KUBARK - CAMBISTA 1 operational activities is undeniable. CAMBISTA 2 was appointed by CAMBISTA 4 to represent CAMBISTA 1 in operational dealings with KUBARK. This appointment was allegedly made to keep CAMBISTA 4 out of the operational scene in order to preserve his stature and integrity as political leader of CAMBISTA 1. In effect, CAMBISTA 2's appointment furnished CAMBISTA 4 with a faithful reporter whose principal operational contributions to CAMBISTA 1 are unwavering loyalty to CAMBISTA 4 and control over the brightest elements of CAMBISTA 1 youth. CAMBISTA 2 tends to approach negotiations with US officials as a process threatening CAMBISTA 1 interests and principles of self-determination. In the past, this has led him on several occasions to introduce a frequently unreasonable note of self-assertion, or rather CAMBISTA 1 - assertion, into many aspects of his dealings with KUBARK. This attitude has been somewhat justified in his mind as a result of past hesitancy and recent (Sep 1953) slashes in KUBARK's financial endorsement of CAMBISTA 1 activities. It is felt that CAMBISTA 2's influence over our dealings with CAMBISTA 1 is principally due to our limitations in developing CAMBISTA 1 beyond those selected by CAMBISTA 2. His selections of personnel for work with KUBARK are obviously based on the individual's personal loyalty to him and dependence upon him. Attempts to loosen CAMBISTA 2's grip on his selected followers have met with failure unless (a) contact between him and the subjects was severed or reduced; (b) subjects were actively assisted in establishing their personal independence from CAMBISTA 2's influence. Operations involving activities of CAMBISTA 1 personnel under CAMBISTA 2 control and supervision have produced the type of results reported on in the following subparagraph.

b. Group Efficacy:

- (1) Directives issued to CAMBISTA 2 for the performance of group operational tasks often resulted in CAMBISTA 2:
 - (a) Muddling case officers' instructions.
 - (b) Applying his questionable brand of operational initiative to the tasks.
 - (c) Making unauthorized commitments to his followers.
 - (d) Producing scanty reports and inadequate financial accounting.

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- (2) In order to improve the quality of CAMBISTA 2 controlled group tasks, it became necessary to reiterate ~~the~~ ~~directives~~ and ~~directives~~ directives, thoroughly illustrate the proposed aims, sharply define inherent financial and other limitations, and under no condition interpret CAMBISTA 2's statement: "I understand." to mean anything other than his desire to follow his own bent. This apparent zeal on the part of the case officers to spell out every conceivable aspect of proposed tasks has annoyed CAMBISTA 2. He may have thought that proper credit was not being given to his intelligence which, by the way, is well developed. However, only unrelenting perseverance by the case officers in defining the smallest details concerning the aims, plans, method, requirements, restrictions, etc., of proposed tasks has overcome CAMBISTA 2's improvisational talents and produced satisfactory results.
- (3) On the few occasions when contact was made directly with members of CAMBISTA 2's group, it became evident that some of these individuals were far more responsive to case officers' outlooks and directives. This seemed to be due to their lack of over-preoccupation about CAMBISTA 1's prestige and organizational pride; genuine interest and enjoyment (unhampered by organizational decorum) in dealing with Americans; and eagerness to understand and adhere to directives issued by professional intelligence men. All too often, however, apparent objectivity of group members was neutralized by their absorption within the recesses of organizational life under CAMBISTA 2's powers of indoctrination. As pointed out in subparagraph "a." above, nothing short of physical removal from CAMBISTA 2's environment can produce any semblance of direct KUBARK control over these individuals.

c. Group Security:

- (1) CAMBISTA 1 personnel are individuals ideologically held together by a loosely knit organization concerned primarily with the social welfare of its members. Their concept of security does not differ from that of most emigres whose normal activities do not prepare them mentally or emotionally to practice security and compartmentation among themselves. They are more apt to be furtive in dealing with KUBARK case officers than discreet within their own circles. The patriotic fervor which binds them together would make it unreasonable in their minds to withhold from each other information which they were urged by Americans to keep to

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themselves. There are, of course, variations to the extent to which CAMBISTA 1 personnel are inclined to make unauthorized disclosures within their circles. It would be unrealistic to think that operational data is indiscriminately spread to CAMBISTA 1 rank and file. It would, however, be equally unrealistic to think that information passed to CAMBISTA 2 or a member of his immediate entourage (which includes MARGONICZ, SURKO, ARCHIUK and SZATZKO) will not circulate within that group and (through human failings, organizational and personal ties) leak out to an extent as yet ungauged by KUBARK.

- (2) The possibility of current penetration of CAMBISTA 1 by the RIS or any other IS can only stem from common sense considerations and speculations, inasmuch as factual data regarding such action can only arise accidentally, i.e., through blunders by the penetration element, or through systematic surveillance involving physical and technical means. Damning accidents have not occurred and, as far as is known to us, no systematic surveillance has been initiated. It is, however, held likely that CAMBISTA 1 is penetrated at some point by the RIS and that CAMBISTA 1 willingly services the information requirements of the Belgian IS. This opinion is based on the following considerations:
 - (a) It is accepted CE knowledge that emigre organizations are primary targets of Soviet penetration.
 - (b) There have been several instances indicating direct Soviet interest in CAMBISTA 1 personalities and group activities, among them:
 - (1) Attempted recruitment by an RIS courier of the editor of CAMBISTA 1's official newspaper (Munich, 1950-51).
 - (2) Delivery of Soviet literature to CAMBISTA 2's Headquarters in Louvain by NILGAI personnel.
- (3) CAMBISTA 1's defense mechanism against Soviet penetration is operationally absurd, inasmuch as their opinion regarding bona fides of CAMBISTA 1 members is principally based on personal evaluation of one CAMBISTA 1 member by another, e.g., if "Boris" saw "Anton" wearing an SS uniform in Minsk in 1943, "Anton" must be one of the boys.

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- (4) Apart from asylum, CAMBISTA 1 members in Belgium appear to enjoy educational and organizational freedoms and privileges probably derived from excellent rapport with key Belgian personalities. It is most unlikely that CAMBISTA 1 leading elements in Belgium refused to cooperate with the intelligence organs of their host country if such cooperation was requested by their Belgian contacts. These factors must furnish the Belgian IS with the necessary leverage to recruit informants among CAMBISTA 1 personnel.

4. Comments on CAMBISTA 1 Personnel Slated for NIGHTWATCH:

Although some of the individuals proposed by CAMBISTA 2 for NIGHTWATCH are bright and well-motivated anti-communists, our opinion is that several factors concerning these individuals restrict their secure and productive use in REDSKIN activities, to wit:

- a. Their identities, motivation, close association with CAMBISTA 2, organizational allegiance, and probably their activities on behalf of the AIS are known to a considerable number of individuals both inside and out of CAMBISTA 1 circles in Belgium, France, Great Britain and Germany.
- b. Operational data passed to them in the form of briefing, involving information requirements, leads, source material, methods of operation, and other data related to the REDSKIN program, would probably circulate among the CAMBISTA 1 elite and eventually leak out through internal organizational channels to external contacts.
- c. Although current plans ^{are} to control NIGHTWATCH activities through one of CAMBISTA 2's young men, it is anticipated that direct and/or indirect involvement of CAMBISTA 2 in the conduct of NIGHTWATCH operations will occur due to the intimate nature of CAMBISTA 2's personal and organizational ties with NIGHTWATCH personnel.

5. Recommendations:

- a. It is recommended that CAMBISTA 1 personnel be used in REDSKIN activities only in the event that no other assets are found to further NIGHTWATCH objectives.
- b. If CAMBISTA 1 personnel are used in NIGHTWATCH, the following is recommended:
 - (1) Confine NIGHTWATCH personnel to low-level activities which do not include contact with Soviet personalities.
 - (2) Do not furnish NIGHTWATCH personnel with operational data which, if intercepted by unauthorized individuals, would reveal REDSKIN objectives, methods, source material, leads, and contacts.

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- (3) Maintain close coordination with SR/3 on all matters pertaining to NIGHTWATCH activities and personnel. We will in turn endeavor to furnish you with every possible assistance at Headquarters and through our representatives in Germany.

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ATTACHMENT No. 3 to OBBW-931

SUBJECT: Digraph 68

REFERENCES: OBBA 798, paragraph 32
OBBA 397
OBBA 828

- | 1. Number on list
attached to OBBA-397 | NIGHTWATCH
Cryptonym | Munich
Cryptonym |
|---|-------------------------|---------------------|
| 5 | 3 | None |
| 6 | 2 | AECAMBISTA/15 |
| 8 | 4 | None |
| 9 | 5 | None |
| 19 | 6 | AECAMBISTA/13 |
| 20 | 7 | AECAMPOSANTO/11 |
| 27 | 8 | None |
| 35 | 9 | AECAMBISTA/14 |
- Regarding OBBA 828, NIGHTWATCH/37 has been changed to NIGHTWATCH/10 and his Munich cryptonym is AECAMPOSANTO/7. NIGHTWATCH/38 has been changed to NIGHTWATCH/11 and he has no Munich cryptonym.
 - CAMBISTA/2 has been assigned NIGHTWATCH/1.
 - Additions to NIGHTWATCH personnel will be assigned numbers commencing with 12.

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